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Drolet: <em>The Generals</em> [Review]

and instruments. Many wounded
soldiers, such as the stoical
Shadrack Byfield submitted quietly
to losing an arm by amputation,
and, in one of the many interesting
snippets that pepper this book,
we are told that Byfield, a weaver
by trade, survived the amputation,
had an artificial limb arranged for
him, and pursued weaving in later
years. We can marvel at the
difficulties of the army surgeon,
and as Dunlop put it correctly,
"there is hardly on the face of the
earth a less enviable situation
than that of an Army Surgeon
after a battle-worn out and
fatigued in body and mind,
surrounded by suffering, pain and
misery, much of which he knows
it is not in his power to heal or
even to assuage. While battle lasts
these all pass unnoticed, but they
come before the medical man
afterwards in all their sorrow and
horror, stripped of all the excitement of the 'heady fight.'" (p.175).
Students of military history,
and the War of 1812 in particular,
will welcome the extensive
bibliography of both primary and
secondary works. The work
contains numerous illustrations
and boasts a serviceable index.
The book is enriched by several
good maps that help the armchair
observer follow the campaign. A
note on terminology and time aids
the reader to follow the sequence
of the battle, and to differentiate
between British and American
forces. Wisely, ancillary data has
been relegated to four appendixes:
Order of Battle and Strength, Left
Division, United States Army;
Order ofBattle and Strength, Right
Division, British Army in Canada,
25 July 1814; The Military Heritage
of the Battle of Lundy's Lane:
Honors, Awards, and Descendants
of the Units of 1814; The Problem
of the Guns (which army was in
possession of the British guns at

the end of the battle); and The
Fate of the Battlefield, 1814-1992.
In regards to the last of these, we
learn, sadly (p.249) that little exists
of the battlefield for the shaded
lane of yesteryear is now a busy
highway crowded with motels,
eateries and souvenir shops. "You
cansleep,"writesGravespoignantly,
"in air-conditioned comfort near
the same spot where the four-times
wounded Jessup formed the
Twenty-Fifth into a single rank to
repel Drummond's last desperate
attack ... "Nearby the Drummond
Hill Cemetery tells a different tale,
and in graves marked and
unmarked lie British, Canadian
and American bodies of this
bloodiest of encounters on the
Niagara.
Barry Gough
Wilfrid Laurier University

lived between one archive
and another, particularly
between one conference and
the next, spinning theories
further and further detached
from whatever it was that
wentonatNeuvill-St. Vaast,
Goose Green, Kuwait City
... Reputations are wonrarely lost-on the issue of
Clausewitz's debt to Kant,
or 'chaos theory and
command'... Like the
"eight-legged" essay of
the Chinese mandarin
examination, for which the
highest marks were given
to those candidates who
most often alluded to the
question without doing
anything as indelicate as
attempting an answer,
military history ala mode
is written through analogy,
subtexts and alternative
readings.

*****

The Generals
The Canadian Army's
Senior Commanders in the
Second World War
J.L. Granatstein. The Generals:
The Canadian Army's Senior
Commanders in the Second World
War. Toronto: Stoddart Publishing
Co., 1993, 370 pages, $35.00.

I

n ending his review ofBetween
Mutiny and Obedience (Times
Literary Supplement, 13May 1994)
makes an unfortunately valid
point about much recent military
historiography when he writes that
the new sort of historian "can
bear the gaze of fact only if it is
veiled in a gauze of abstract ideas,
woven from the busy looms of
social science and political theory."
He goes on to discuss whole
wacademic lives being successfully

Most of our military historians
are free of Keegan's charges and
this includes Jack Granatstein,
even if he is an "academic." In the
volume I have been asked to
review, a "collective biography" of
Canada's Second World War
military leadership, the former
Sandhurst lecturer, Keegan,
would have considerable difficulty
finding support for his thesis.
It must be assumed that the
general reader with no more than
a passing interest in his country's
history, military or other, may
still believe naively (and in spite of
the twisted efforts of manipulative media people with revisionist
axes to grind) that the men who
led the men in '39-'45 wore the
mantle of heroic leadership with
appropriate modesty grounded in
the firm conviction of the rightness
of the cause coupled with the
ability to lead with both
inspiration and competence.
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Granatstein, near the very beginning. reminds his readers by
quoting Churchill that it "isn't only
the good boys who help to win wars;
it is the sneaks and stinkers as well."
At the close of the opening
paragraph to his "Conclusion,"
Granatstein states ". . . no one
should attempt to hide the brutal
fact that Canadian soldiers
probably died from the effects
of interwar neglect on their
commanders and staffs." The word
"probably" is much too tentative.
Moreover, the prewar neglect
combined with wartime pettiness,
ambition, incompetence, and
intransigence sealed the fate of
many more whose only choice was
to obey. What precedes should
not be construed as a blanket
condemnation by Granatstein or
this reviewer of Canada's generals.
There were, because they were
human, sneaks and stinkers
among them and their presence
resulted in delaying, if not
preventing victory. But, mercifully,
there were others whose natural
leadership qualities gained for
them the respect both of the men
they commanded and of the
enemies they faced. Unfortunately
none of these reached the pinnacle
of the army's hierarchy. And lest
we all be accused of national
breast-beating, it should be home
in mind that very few of any of the
combatant nations were blessed
with the likes of a Slim, a Juin, an
O'Connor (before his capture) or a
Manstein.
Unlike some of his colleagues,
Granatstein is never mean-spirited
nor is he even disdainful of his
subjects although some, by their
actions, were beneath anyone's
contempt. He tries to avoid gossip
and generally succeeds. Since his
is a socio-political approach to
leadership, his almost total
avoidance of operations leads him
to certain conclusions as to the

efficacy of field commanders that
are open to serious challenge.
Objectivity, that ever elusive goal
of all historians, is as attainable
in Granatstein's mind as it can
possibly be and he strives for it at
all times.
His highly effective use of
source materials and his sharp
eye for the human element allow
him to expose the sometimes
comic, sometimes tragic dimensions
in the lives ofhis characters. When
Andy McNaughton, the brilliant,
anachronistic champion of the
Canadian soldier, learns of his
dismissal, he says to his companion, "I hope there won't be a mutiny
in the army." In fact, there was
"scarcely a ripple." True pathos.

Granatstein's eye for the relevant
also helps. In his discussion of the
ups and downs of"Tommy" Bums'
career, we see the man as three
dimensional. We are also privy to
his brilliance although this would
never suffice either to obtain or
maintain the loyalty and devotion
of his subordinates in the field,
especially the outstanding
militiaman, Hoffmeister or the
gruff, hard-nosed Vokes. But it is
difficult to imagine a more precise
assessment of the ideal soldier
than this Burns definition: " ...
a primitive, honest fellow,
uncomplicated by elaborate

thought-machinery or superfluous
ideas. He makes a simple and
reliable tool which ... will not get
out of order at critical moments or
commence to function erratically."
The egghead Burns shot
himself in the foot once too often
because of severe personality
problems and these, along with
his sexual escapades and other
indiscretions, proved his undoing. Granatstein alludes to these
without dwelling on them in any
sensational fashion. He also refers
to Vokes as a womanizer and
Keller's sexual peccadilloes. But
when it comes to Guy Simonds,
perhaps because of a blind spot
caused by enthusiastic admiration,
the author makes no mention of
Simonds' affair with Mona
Anderson nor the nastiness of his
divorce from "K" Lockhart and his
subsequent marriage to Dorothy.
This is not a plea for titillation but
for equal treatment.
An argument could be made
for a lapse in authorial objectivity
in the case of the section on
Simonds. Earlier, Granatstein's
fair-mindedness prevented him
from judging Crerar as harshly as
he perhaps should have been,
given the evidence of his paranoia
and hunger for power. But in the
chapterdealingwithSimonds, the
latter's attachment to the cruel.
arrogant
and
egotistical
Montgomery makes him out to be
a chip off the old Monty block.
This also seems to fit into the
obsequious colonial's mould
vis-a-vis the imperial master.
Earlier, Granatstein did not fail to
make the point of British
arrogance concerning the
Canadians especially on the part
of Oliver Leese and in the
treatment accorded Burns, Crerar
and, earlier, McNaughton. But in
the Simonds section, Granatstein
even uses the same chapter
heading ("Master of the Battlefield")
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as Nigel Hamilton used for the
title of the second volume of his
Montgomery biography.
Simonds, according to
Granatstein, was "the best soldier
Canada has produced in the
Second World War." Suchastrong
categorical statement has been
assailed in some quarters among
Canadian historians. The general
consensus seems to be that
although that may be true, it also
left much to be desired. There is
no mention of Simonds' role in the
closing stages of the war in the
Rhineland. In fighting that was
reminiscent of Flanders, the
two-pronged attack was delayed
until the start of February so that
armoured mobility was lost in
the mud while air support was
reduced by cloud and poor
visibility. Startling mistakes were
made by usually reliable
commanders. Some contend that
Simonds allowed his rivalry with the
popular Horrocks to lead him into
murderous and needless fighting.
The point is moot to this day.
My allotted space does not
allow me to do justice to this very
worthwhile book. There are lapses
as has been pointed out. Some
generals receive treatment that is
cursory at best (Foulkes, Kitching,
Worthington) while others whose
careers were spectacular and
successful (Holly Keefler) leave the
reader like Oliver Twist asking for
"More please, sir!"
The section of the political
generals, particularly Maurice
Pope, are thought-provoking and
disturbingly prophetic. Pope's
remarkable loyalty and clearheadedness deserve to be better
known. This dovetails nicely into
Granatstein's candid and wellbalanced treatment of the
absence of French-Canadian
generals. His interpretation of Ken
Stuart's role in this situation is
debatable as was his involvement in

the manpower shortage crisis. It is
revealing to read Crerar's opinion
of General La Fleche as being
"entirely unmoral ... very dangerous
. . . an utter egomaniac." In the
light of what has been revealed
about Crerar himself, this is a
clear case of "the pot calling the
kettle black."
Granatstein concludes that
Canada's "share of victory owed
more to the common soldiers than
to the generals." Nevertheless,
victory could not have been
achieved without the generals who
because of their "psychological
colonial status" were "condemned
to practise deference to their
betters and control in the
presence of subordinates."
Specialists may and will quibble
with Granatstein on some or many
points but most will be satisfied,
even impressed, generally.
Gil Drolet

*****

When Your
Number's Up
The Canadian Soldier in
the First World War
Desmond Morton. When Your
Number's Up: The Canadian
Soldier in the First World War,
(Toronto: Random House, 1993)
354 pages, $32.50.

W

hile the exploits of the
Canadian Expeditionary
Force at Vimy Ridge, St. Julien
and elsewhere along the Western
Front have been documented
thoroughly, the individuals who
made up the ranks of the CEF
have not been considered in any
great depth. With this intent in
mind Desmond Morton has

writtenhislatestbook, When Your
Number's Up, which examines
these Canadian soldiers and "the
factors that shaped their lives and
hastened their deaths." [p.vii] .
The study is informed by an
impressive array of existing
scholarship on the First World
War, much of it Morton's own
work. In addition, the author has
examined a wide variety of primary
material, including diaries, letters
and correspondence of Canadian
soldiers. He is thus able to capture,
in an anecdotal fashion, the
experiences ofthese men, thereby
providing a uniquely personal
perspective on Canada's role in
the conflict.
Morton begins his study by
assessing the nation's response to
the outbreak of hostilities in 1914,
noting that for most Canadians,
war seemed "a remote, romantic
adventure." He illustrates the
unbridled fervour which characterized the first weeks of the war
in Canada, culminating with the
departure of the First Contingent
of the CEF in early October. As
recruiting continued, however, it
gradually became apparent that
Canadian enthusiasm for military
service had its limits. Sam
Hughes' Department of Militia was
soon forced to resort to increasingly
imaginative recruiting schemes.
By the fall of 1915, Morton
suggests, somewhat charitably,
"Anyone with a bright idea and
access to the Minister" could
organize a battalion for overseas
service. [p.57] Judging by the
turmoil thatensuedinmanyparts
of the country, it would seem that
"bright" ideas were not always
a necessity.
Despite spirited recruiting
efforts, Morton maintains that by
late 1916 the well of volunteers
had largely run dry. He discusses
the unrest that accompanied
conscription, noting that while
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